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Abstract
We study the interaction between income inequality and technology diffusion, and
their joint effect on welfare inequality. Our model predicts that when combined with
income inequality, technical progress that manifests itself as an enlargement of
consumers’ choice set leads to increased welfare inequality, and not only to
improved welfare to all. The model also predicts that the higher the income-share
of the highest income decile, the higher the penetration rate of the new technology
at early stages of diffusion. We provide empirical support for this relation using
international data on mobile phones. Income inequality thus systematically
understates welfare inequality. This result, coupled with the documented skill-
biased nature of the recent technical change, suggests that the progress has
disproportionately benefited highly educated individuals not on one, but two fronts.
JEL Classification: O33, I3, I30, I39, D12
Keywords: income inequality, mobile phones, technology diffusion, welfare inequality.
Ari Hyytinen Otto Toivanen
ETLA HECER
Lönnrotinkatu 4B P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)
FI-00100 Helsinki FI-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND FINLAND
e-mail: ari.hyytinen@etla.fi e-mail: otto.toivanen@helsinki.fi
* Hyytinen: The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Lönnrotinkatu 4B,
00100 Helsinki, Finland, Email: Ari.Hyytinen@etla.fi. Toivanen: HECER, University of
Helsinki, PO Box 17 FIN 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland and ETLA, Email:
otto.toivanen@helsinki.fi. We would like to thank seminar audiences in Berkeley, HECER
and University of Jyväskylä, Jenny and Peter Lanjouw, Matti Liski, Ted Miguel, Paul
Stoneman and Frank Verboven for discussions. Both authors thankfully acknowledge
financial support by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. Hyytinen also acknowledges financial
support by the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth foundation. Much of this research was carried out
while the authors were visiting University of California, Berkeley, whose hospitality is
gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveat applies.
I INTRODUCTION
The effects of technological change on income inequality continue to be the objective
of intensive research efforts in economics, the evidence suggesting that during the last
century, technical change has been skill-biased (see e.g. Acemoglu 2002) and that
technological change may lead not only to wage inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers, but also within such groups (Galor and Moav 2000). The other side
of this relationship – how income inequality affects the speed at which the fruits of
technical progress, new consumption goods, are taken up by consumers – has
attracted far less attention. Both technology diffusion (see e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig
1995 and Stoneman 2001) and income inequality (e.g. Piketty 2003) as separate topics
have a long, venerable tradition in economics that their central roles in the creation of
welfare and in its distribution warrant. However, their interaction has largely been
ignored. The closest treatments are those by Cutler and Katz (1992) and Blundell and
Preston (1998) who study the relationship between consumption and income
inequality. There is however an important difference between these studies and our
question: The former take the choice set of consumers as given, whereas we explore
the interaction between income inequality and technology diffusion, and their joint
effect on welfare inequality.
This absolute and comparative neglect does not mean that economists haven’t
been aware of the potential interaction between income inequality and the diffusion of
new goods. Indeed, e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) bring it up. They express
regret that there is no data available to empirically study this potentially important
relation. To the best of our knowledge, the void detected by Deaton and Muellbauer
1has not been filled in the quarter century that has passed since they wrote their book.1
Our objective in this paper is to start filling this gap.
We go one step further by studying the joint effect of income inequality and
technology  diffusion  on  welfare  inequality.  In  Section  II  we  show  with  a  simple
dynamic model similar in spirit to that of Deaton and Muellbauer’s that a richer (high-
income) consumer benefits from technical progress more than she would if she were
poor  (low-income),  and  that  this  is  not  a  temporary,  but  a  permanent  effect.  The
conditions under which the result holds are quite general and the underlying
economics is intuitive: First, a richer consumer adopts the new technology earlier than
she would if she were poor. Second, and more subtle, the differences in (flow) welfare
between the rich and the poor when also the poor consumer has adopted the new good
is larger compared to the case when the new good was not available. Therefore
welfare inequality, conditional on both the poor and the rich having adopted, is larger
than without technical progress even when tastes are exactly identical. The result
obtains (in ways we make precise below) both as long as the new good is not a strong
substitute for existing products, and as long as it is to a “large enough extent” a
consumption rather than a production good.2 Thus, while technical progress makes
everybody better off through the introduction of new goods, it increases welfare
inequality when combined with cross-sectional income inequality.
1 We are aware of two papers that study technology diffusion and use a measure of income inequality:
Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) study the diffusion of internet in the OECD countries. They use the Gini-
coefficient as an instrument in their access cost equation, in which it obtains a positive and significant
coefficient. Tellis, Stremersch, and Yin (2003) study the takeoff of 137 new products in 16 European
countries. The Gini-coefficient is not significant in their estimations. As will be clear from our
theoretical analysis, this finding is not surprising: There does not have to be a linear relation between
the Gini-coefficient and the diffusion path of a technology over the whole support of an income
distribution. An economy with a relatively even distribution of income may have a higher penetration
rate than an economy with an unequal distribution for a substantial portion of the diffusion path, and
vice versa.
2 We apply our theory to diffusion of mobile phones which are acknowledged to be partly a production
good; see e.g. The Economist, March 12th, 2005: Economic Focus: Calling across the divide.
2The model also predicts that with identical tastes, the income distribution and
the price-path of the new technology are the sole determinants of technology
diffusion, and once the effect of price changes has been controlled for, the diffusion
curve maps one-to-one to the income distribution curve. While the data requirements
for testing this relation are large, the following implication of the model is testable
with international data on penetration rates of a technology, and available data on
income distribution: Controlling for mean income and differences in prices and tastes,
we  should  find  that  the  higher  the  income  share  of  the  highest  earning  decile,  the
higher the penetration rate in the early stage of the diffusion process.
The ideal technology for testing this prediction - and our theory more
generally - would be a pure consumption good that is fundamentally new,
economically important when brought to the market, and (at least initially) quite
expensive relative to the available income of consumers. We test the prediction using
data on mobile phones, discussing the data in Section III. A mobile phone is to a large
degree a consumption good that apparently has no near substitutes (see Hausman
2002 for a survey).3 Reflecting this, Hausman (1997) has estimated large consumer
welfare effects from the introduction of mobile phones using U.S. data. Matching
high quality international panel data on penetration rates and other crucial information
on mobile phones to data on the income share of the highest earning decile and
country characteristics we show in Section IV that countries with a more skew income
3 It has turned out to be difficult to obtain global data on mobile phones prices which would be needed
to evaluate their budget share. As we will explain later, our sample consists (mostly) of developing
countries, where the budget share is apparently still high: In a recent article of technology journalist
Robert Clark that appeared in Telecom Asia (Wireless Asia, October 2004), he concluded that “Thanks
to the availability of prepaid and micro-credit, the actual service cost is hardly a barrier. Their main
obstacle is the phone itself.” Based on pieces of information that we have been able to collect, we
conjecture that in our sample, the ratio of the cost of mobile phone to the average gdp per capita has
been at least 10%.
3distribution have a higher penetration rate of mobile phones in the early stages of the
diffusion process.
We discuss the implications of our results in the concluding Section V. Given
that new consumption goods have been a major source of advances in living quality at
least during the last century (see e.g. Bresnahan and Gordon 1997), our intertemporal
account suggests that measures of income inequality systematically understate welfare
inequality. Matching this result with those of the literature on technical change and
income inequality suggests that technical change favors high-skill individuals not on
one, but two fronts: earnings, and consumption of new goods.
II. THEORY
A. Consumer level analysis
Let’s first study the problem facing an individual consumer: she has to decide when to
adopt the new technology that has been introduced. The way we formalize this is that
the choice set of the consumer is widened to include the new good. We will set up the
simplest possible model that allows us to study the implications of the enlarged choice
set. In order to make things interesting, we assume that the consumer has a constant
(flow) income and a binding budget constraint, denoting by w>0 the amount she can
spend per unit of time (and by W the net present value of her life-time budget).
Because of technical progress, she has two consumption possibilities: to consume
what we call the outside good (the good(s) that existed prior to the introduction of the
new good), the price of which is normalized to be one, and to consume the new good.
In line with the literature on technology adoption we assume the latter decision to be
discrete: either she consumes a fixed amount of the new good at a given point in time,
4or she does not consume it at all.4 Denoting the lifetime utility of the consumer by
V(X,Y),  where  X (Y)  is  the  consumption  path  of  the  outside  (new)  good consumed
and denoting the flow consumptions by lower case letters, her optimization problem
(given our assumptions discussed below) can be expressed as:
(1) òò
¥
-- -+=
T
rt
T
rt
T dteytpwUdtewUYXV )),(()0,(),(max
0
.
In (1), r is the discount rate of the consumer, t is time, T is the (first) time when the
consumer buys the new good, p(t) is the price of the new good at time t, and U(x,y) is
the per-unit-of-time utility of consuming x units of the outside (numeraire) good, and
y units of the new good.
In standard fashion, we assume that U is continuous, increasing and strictly
concave in its arguments.5 In addition, we assume that the consumer’s demand for the
outside and new good are independent, i.e., 0)0,(),( =-º= xUyxUUU xxxyyx ,
where xU  denotes the derivative of U w.r.t to x. Our results are strengthened if x and
y are complements (i.e., if ( , ) ( ,0) 0x xU x y U x- > , and hold for substitutes (i.e., if
( , ) ( ,0) 0x xU x y U x- < ) as long as xyU  is not excessively negative. In similar fashion,
the  analysis  below assumes  that  the  new good is  a  pure  consumption  good,  and  our
results hold as long as the extent to which the new good is used for production is
below a certain bound.6
4 This could without difficulty be generalized to a situation where the consumer has to pay a fixed fee
to have access to the new good (the handset, for example, in case of mobile phones), and then pays a
variable price that depends on consumption (number and length of calls).
5 The assumption of diminishing marginal rate of utility from consumption means that our utility
function is ordinal, and our welfare results are dependent on this.
6 We return to the case of substitutes between the new good and the outside good and the degree to
which the new good can be a production good in Appendix I, where we derive bounds that ensure that
all our results go through. Note that if the new and outside goods are “strong” substitutes or the degree
to which the new good is a production good is “large”, our propositions would be reversed. Our
empirical results reject the possibility that mobile phones are a “strong” substitute for the outside good
in our data.
5A standard assumption of the technology diffusion literature, invoked with
some empirical backing, is that the price of the new good, p(t), is decreasing over
time. We adopt this assumption. The way we have modeled the purchase price of the
new  technology,  the  new  good  is  to  be  interpreted  either  as  a  non-durable,  or  as  a
durable, with the rental price (including usage cost) being p(t) at time t.7 With the
latter interpretation our model allows for borrowing.8 We  also  assume  that  p(0)<w,
i.e.,  the  price  of  the  new  good  at  date  0  is  within  the  flow  budget  constraint  of  the
consumer.
Given our assumption of monotonously declining prices, the decision a
consumer faces is when to start consuming the new good. We simplify the decision
problem by assuming that there is no uncertainty whatsoever: the consumer knows the
future price path of the new technology, as well as that of the outside good (and her
flow income). Equation (1) also makes it clear that the effect of adopting the new
good is twofold: first, consumption of it naturally jumps from zero to y. Second, the
consumption of the outside good decreases from w (i.e., prior to adoption, the
consumer spent her entire budget on the outside good) to w-p(t).
Maximizing (1) with respect to T, the time of adoption, and simplifying, yields
the following first order condition:
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7 Think for example of p(t) consisting of two parts, the fixed rental cost ?f and the time-varying usage
cost ?v(t), with interpretations similar to those in footnote 5.
8 We do not explicitly allow for saving for two reasons: First, allowing for a crude form of saving (i.e.,
for a fixed saving period just prior to the optimal, no-saving adoption date) suggests that our key
comparative static results are strengthened. Second, an explicit treatment would necessitate stronger
assumptions on e.g. the form of the utility function. The reason why our comparative static results are
strengthened when studying how the optimal adoption date changes when some saving is allowed is
twofold: On the one hand, utility from the consumption of the new good is independent of the
consumption level of the outside good. On the other hand, the costs of saving derive from the utility
from consuming the outside good that is foregone while saving. These costs are smaller, the higher is
the flow income of the consumer. This implies that the consumer will save (and adopt marginally
earlier) if her income is above a threshold, and will not save otherwise. If this threshold of income is
large enough, no one saves.
6The two terms characterize the difference in flow utility that the consumer
experiences by adopting at time T: By adopting, she ceases to receive the flow utility
U(w,0) and instead receives U(w-p(T),y). The second order condition holds globally
(i.e., for all nonnegative adoption times), because 0tp < , and 0>xU . Equation (2)
characterizes the optimal adoption date for adoption, and we denote it by T*.
To link diffusion to income distribution we first have to show how changes in
the budget constraint affect the optimal adoption time. Utilizing the implicit function
theorem and rearranging we get:
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Equation (3) delivers our first proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: An increase in flow income leads a consumer to adopt the new
good earlier.
PROOF: The denominator in (3) is the second order condition of the optimization
problem and thus negative. The adoption of the new good leads to a (discrete)
decrease in the consumption of the outside good, and because 0<xxU  and 0=xyU ,
we know that )0,()*),(( wUyTpwU xx >- .  The  numerator  is  therefore  positive,  and
dT*/dw < 0. QED.
Proposition 1 establishes a negative relationship between (flow) income and
time of adoption.9 To understand the intuition behind the result, consider a consumer
with different budget constraints. Irrespective of the budget constraint, she has to give
up to the same amount of consumption of the outside good to consume the new good
(at a given point in time). Because the marginal utility from consuming the outside
good is decreasing, the opportunity cost of purchasing the new good is lower for the
9 The  proposition  always  holds  if  x  and  y  are  complements.  It  holds  for  substitutes  if  the  degree  of
substitution is not excessively “large”; see Appendix I for details.
7consumer when she has a higher income. She therefore adopts earlier, the higher her
income.
Next we want to consider the following thought-experiment: How does the
enlargement of the choice set affect the lifetime utility of a consumer and thus her
welfare, depending on her budget constraint?
B. New goods and welfare inequality
This  slight  detour  allows  us  to  place  our  (empirical)  results  in  a  broader  context  by
enabling us to map our results to changes in welfare inequality that are due to the
introduction new goods made possible by technical progress. In particular, this detour
illustrates how income inequality and the introduction of new goods interact and what
the (joint) effect of that interaction on welfare inequality is.
Consider two income levels 21 , ww , where 21 ww > . Proposition 1 tells us that
the consumer will adopt the good earlier if her income is 1w  rather than 2w . One
would suspect that this increases the difference in discounted utility, i.e. welfare
inequality that follows from inequality in income, until the consumer with income 2w
adopts. This is indeed the case. There is another effect however: It turns out that even
after the date when the consumer would have adopted the new good given the lower
income, the difference in flow utilities increases compared to the “old” choice set that
existed prior to the introduction of the new good. We express these results in
Proposition 2:
PROPOSITION 2: Welfare inequality is larger when the new good is available
compared to the situation when it is not available, i.e.,
)0,()0,(),(max),(max 21|| 21 WVWVYXVYXV wwTwwT ->- == .
8PROOF: The change in the difference of discounted utilities can be divided into two:
the effect through the different adoption dates, and the effect through different
changes in flow utility, conditional on adoption under both budget constraints. We use
this decomposition and show that both effects increase the difference in flow utility.
By proposition  1  we know that  with  income 1w  the consumer adopts earlier
than with income 2w . Let
*
1T  (
*
2T ) be the optimal adoption date given income 1w
( 2w ).  Our  first  claim  can  be  expressed  in  flow  terms  as
1 2 1 2( ( ), ) ( ,0) ( ,0) ( ,0)U w p t y U w U w U w- - ³ -  for )* *1 2,t T TéÎ ë . By revealed
preference we know that over this time interval )0,()),(( 11 wUytpwU ³- . Our
assumption 0tp <  implies 1 1( ( ), ) ( ,0)U w p t y U w- >  for ( )* *1 2,t T TÎ . The first claim
therefore holds.
The  second  claim  can  be  written  (again  in  flow  terms)  as
1 1 2 2( ( ), ) ( ,0) ( ( ), ) ( ,0)U w p t y U w U w p t y U w- - ³ - -  for )*2 ,t TéÎ ¥ë .  Under  the
maintained assumption 0=xyU , 1 2( ( ), ) ( ( ), )U w p t y U w p t y- - - =
1 2( ( ),0) ( ( ),0)U w p t U w p t- - -  holds.  The inequality can therefore be rearranged as
1 2 1 2( ( ),0) ( ( ),0) ( ,0) ( ,0)U w p t U w p t U w U w- - - ³ - . This inequality is strict for
)*2 ,t TéÎ ¥ë , because U is concave. QED.
Proposition 2 establishes that a richer consumer benefits from technical
progress (the enlargement of the choice set) in two ways. First, she accesses the flow
utility enabled by the new technology earlier. Because of this difference in flow utility
for )* *1 2,t T TéÎ ë , technical progress results in a larger difference in the discounted
utility. During the period when it is suboptimal for the consumer with lower income
9to adopt the new technology, it is as if this consumer acted under the old choice set
(the one that existed prior to the introduction of the new good).
Second, and more subtle, higher income results in a higher difference in flow
utility after *2T , which is the optimal adoption date with lower income. The reason is
that irrespective of income, the consumer has to lower the consumption of the outside
good by the same amount ( ( )p t )  to  be  able  to  consume  the  new  good.  Given  that
marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in the amount consumed, the change in
utility from this reduction in consumption is lower, the higher is the income.
The first effect holds irrespective of whether the new good is a complement or
substitute for the existing good(s). The second effect is reinforced if the new good is a
complement, but can be reversed if the outside good and the new good are substitutes.
It  does hold,  however,  as long as the new good is not a too strong substitute for the
existing goods.
Summing up our detour, we have shown that when combined with an initial
level of income inequality, technical progress increases welfare inequality
permanently. It does so because the fruits of technical progress, new consumption
goods, expand the choice set of consumers and because this expansion benefits a
richer consumer more than a more budget-constrained consumer.
C. Individual decisions and the income distribution
To link the income distribution to the diffusion path of a new good, we assume that
instead of one consumer, the economy consists of a unit mass of identical consumers.
We also make the following assumption:
10
THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION ASSUMPTION: The support of income in the
economy is ],[ ww  and ( )F w  is the distribution of w such that ?( )F w  is the proportion
of consumers for whom ww ?£ . Further, 1)( =wF  and 0)( >wF .
Invoking this assumption leads to our next proposition:
PROPOSITION 3: At time T~ , the proportion of consumers who have adopted the
new technology is given by )~(1 wF- , where w~  is the income of those consumers for
whom *~ TT = .
PROOF: Since the relationship between income and adoption time is negative and
monotone by Proposition 1, at any point t in time all (none of) those consumers with
incomes higher (lower) than those consumers for whom t is the optimal adoption date
have already adopted. QED.
Proposition 3 establishes a one-to-one mapping from the income distribution
to the diffusion path of a new technology. If one had data on prices, and the new good
didn’t change its characteristics over time, one could actually back out the income
distribution from the observed diffusion path (penetration rates) of the new good.
Unfortunately, price data is hard to come by. Also, any new good is subject to quality
changes after its introduction, meaning that even if price data were available, one
would have to calculate a hedonic price index to take into account technical progress
that takes place after the introduction of the new good.
Lacking data on prices and quality improvements, we will concentrate on the
following simpler hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS: In the early stages of the diffusion path, the higher is the income
share of the highest earning individuals, the higher is the penetration rate.
Imagine starting from a virtual price, the lowest price at which no individual
consumes the new good (Hausman 1997), and lowering the price by a little amount.
11
The fatter the upper tail of the income distribution, the more individuals will be able
and willing to buy the new good at the new price. In our simple model with identical
tastes, all consumers above a certain income level will buy the new good. An
important  qualification  to  this  prediction  is  that  it  only  holds  for  early  stages  of  the
diffusion  path:  Of  two economies  with  the  same mean income,  the  economy with  a
more even distribution of income may have a higher penetration rate for a substantial
portion  of  the  diffusion  path.  It  is  however  always  so  that  the  economy  with  more
weight in the upper tail of the income distribution will have higher penetration rates
initially.
This qualification can be easily illustrated comparing two hypothetical
economies with the same mean income, but with different income distributions. Let us
for simplicity assume that the price of the new good decreases linearly, and that the
income distribution in country A is uniform on [ , ]w w , and that in country B
everybody has the same income. Let us further assume that the price at time 0 is such
that only the wealthiest in country A adopt and that eventually the price reaches a
level  where  even  the  poorest  in  country  A  adopt.  Under  these  assumptions,  the
diffusion path in country A is linear. That of country B however is discrete: With
identical tastes and incomes, everybody in country B will adopt at the same time. We
illustrate these cases in Figure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
As can be seen from the figure, at the moment when all country B’s consumers adopt,
half  of  country  A’s  consumers  have  adopted;  the  other  half,  with  incomes  less  than
that of country B’s consumers, will adopt later. Thus, until the time when all country
B’s consumers adopt, country A’s penetration rate will be higher than country B’s.
12
Thereafter, up to the time when even the poorest consumers in country A adopt,
country B’s penetration rate will be higher than country A’s.
This example illustrates our hypothesis and our qualification to it: First, the
economy with more weight in the upper tail of the income distribution will have
higher penetration rates initially. Second, the relation does not necessarily hold over
the whole support of the income distribution, for the economy with a more even
distribution of income may have a higher penetration rate for a substantial portion of
the diffusion path.
III. DATA
In our  empirical  analysis,  we  use  data  on  mobile  phones,  as  these  data  satisfy  three
key requirements: First, as discussed in the introduction, mobile phones are primarily
a consumption good. Second, high quality data on the penetration rates of the
technology over countries exist for the early parts of the diffusion process, when
penetration rates are still low. Third, good and internationally comparable measures of
the income share of the highest earning decile are available for the same years. These
requirements  turn  out  to  be  quite  limiting.  For  example,  the  excellent,  and  publicly
available technology diffusion data set of Comin and Hobijn (2004) that contains data
over 23 countries and 25 technologies only covers six technologies that can be viewed
as  mainly  or  at  least  to  a  large  extent  consumption  goods  (mail,  telephones,  mobile
phones, newspapers, radios, television). Of these six, most have been introduced
much earlier than mobile phones (newspapers diffused in the early 1900s, radios in
the 20’s and 30’s, and TV in the 50’s and 60’s in the countries in the Comin and
Hobijn data set), and internationally comparable high quality income distribution data
is not available for those years.
13
Our data shares a deficiency with most if not all consumer good diffusion data
sets that cover several countries: We lack information on prices. Most of the diffusion
data  sets  that  do  contain  prices  (e.g.  Karshenas  and  Stoneman  1993)  are  on
manufacturing technologies. We control for the lack of price data in several ways in
our empirical specification.
Our data come from several sources. The mobile phone data – penetration
rates,10 technologies  in  use  (analog  and  digital),  number  of  firms,  use  of  so-called
prepaid cards, and the concentration ratio – come from the standard source of
international mobile phone data, EMC.11 Our country characteristics are from WDI,
legal origin variables from La Porta et al. (1997), and political and civil rights
variables from Freedom House (2002). The data on the income share of the highest
earning decile come from WIDER (2000). The EMC data gives us the relevant
variables for all years for which a mobile phone network has existed in a given
country. It covers all countries that have introduced mobile phones. So does WDI and
Freedom House.
The most limiting source of data is WIDER both quantity and potentially
quality-wise. Quantity-wise, unlike the other data (with the exception of the legal
origin variables which naturally are a cross section), it does not form a complete
panel. Quality-wise, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) point out several difficulties in
using secondary datasets, and emphasize the difficulties related to inequality
measures, in particular, the Gini-coefficient. As stated before, we use the income
share of the highest earning decile. This choice is motivated by our theory, as a Gini-
coefficient does not provide a one-to-one mapping to an income distribution, and
hence we would not be able to assign a priori a sign to its coefficient in a regression.
10 The penetration rate is defined as #mobile phones/population.
11 Most studies of the mobile phone industry that we know use EMC data. Examples are Gruber and
Verboven (2001), and Liikanen, Stoneman and Toivanen (2004).
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The choice is also motivated by data quality considerations: the income share of the
highest  earning  decile  is  also  more  easily  measured,  and  therefore  less  prone  to
measurement error, than a Gini-coefficient. To further ensure constancy, we only use
those income decile data that WIDER denotes high quality and which are measured
consistently over years and countries.12
WIDER provides high-quality income decile data, measured at the household
level, for 84 countries, of which 52 remain in our sample (sample countries are listed
in Appendix II). This results in a sample of 318 observations. For many countries
(31), there is just one value for the income variable, for others up to three. We have
opted for using always the latest measure of the income share of the highest earning
decile, with the proviso that if there are several values (measured in different years)
for a given country, we always use for year t the value that has been measured prior to
year  t,  if  such  a  value  is  available.  Otherwise,  we  use  the  value  that  has  been
measured in the year closest to the year t. Our results are robust to controlling for
measurement error that this infrequent measurement of inequality potentially induces.
The number of country-year observations depends on when the first mobile
phone network was opened in a country. The opening year varies between 1982
(Spain) and 1997 (Mali and Niger). The mean penetration rate of mobile phones at the
end of 1998 (end of our sample period) is only 1.6 per cent, reflecting the fact that our
sample countries are mostly (the exception being Spain) developing countries. The
two highest penetration rates in 1998 in our data are 17% (Spain) and 7% (Latvia).
While the penetration rates in 1998 were clearly higher in developed countries that are
12 The WIDER data is based on the Deininger and Squire data set, with significant updates. WIDER
divides the data quality-wise into four categories. We only use observations that have been ranked into
the highest category (‘Reliable income of expenditure data referring to the entire (national) population,
not affected by apparent inconsistencies’, WIDER, 2000, pp. 10), and where the sample unit is
‘household’, enumeration unit ‘person’ and income definition ‘expenditure’.
15
not in the sample, this level of penetration suits well our income distribution data and
our proposed test.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The mean gdp per capita in our sample (PPP figures from WDI) is 3 800 $, with a
relatively high variance (see Table 1). The mean income share of the highest earning
decile is 31 per cent, with the figure varying between 19 (Spain, measured in 1996)
and 48 per cent (Kenya, measured in 1992).
Whether the positive relationship between the income share of the highest
decile and the penetration rate that theory predicts to exist is supported by the data is
not clear: The correlation between the log income share of the highest earning decile
and the log penetration rate, calculated using 1998 data, is -.24 (significant at 9%
level). The most obvious explanation for the sign of the correlation is that we have a
rather influential observation unit in the data: Spain has the by far highest penetration
rate and one of the lowest income shares of the highest earning decile (see above, and
Appendix II). Removing Spain results in a correlation of -.15, which is not
statistically significant. However, the sign still is opposite to that predicted by the
theory. Another obvious explanation for the sign of the pair-wise correlation is that
the calculation does not control for overall (mean) income level, which we measure
by log gdp per capita. Indeed, in our data the correlation between log gdp per capita
and the log income share of the highest earning decile is negative. Using 1998 data it
is -.38 and significant at 1% level. However, dropping Spain the 1998 cross-sectional
correlation is -.30 and insignificant.
Another important prediction of the model receives support from the raw data:
The simple correlation coefficient between the overall income level, as measured by
log gdp per capita, and the log penetration rate is .82 using the 1998 cross-section.
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The coefficient is significant at better than 1% level. The correlation between log gdp
per capita and the log penetration rate is still .80 and significant after Spain is dropped
from the sample.
IV. EMPIRICS
A. The econometric model
The literature on new technology diffusion is large, and the standard approach in the
diffusion literature is to model the diffusion speed (see e.g. Gruber and Verboven
2001, and Liikanen, Stoneman, and Toivanen 2004 for examples on mobile phones).13
Our model does not relate income inequality to the diffusion speed, but to the
penetration rate of the new technology. Consequently, and following e.g. Caselli and
Coleman (2001), we estimate models of the following form:
(4) itititit incXpen edb ++= ,
where pen is the penetration rate of mobile phones in country i in year t, X is a vector
of country-level control variables, inc is the income share of the highest earning
decile, e  is  the  error  term, b  a vector of parameters to be estimated, and d  the
parameter characterizing the effect of the income share of the highest earning decile
on the penetration rate of mobile phones. We will use logarithmic transformations of
all continuous variables.
We have four groups of control variables. The first group consists of country
and industry observables: Our control vector will include the (log) gdp per capita to
control for the mean income. Our model predicts this to have a positive effect on the
penetration  rate.  To  control  for  differences  in  tastes,  we  include  the  population,  the
geographic area, the proportion of urban and female population, and the age-
13 Rouvinen (2004) studies the differences in the diffusion speeds of mobile phones in developed and
developing countries using this approach, but without using data on income inequality.
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dependency ratio in the estimation. These have been shown in previous studies to
affect the diffusion speed of mobile phones. We also include the penetration rate of
fixed line phones.
In most countries, handsets are sold by mobile phone operators who bundle
them with calling plans. Thus, controls for operator market power will control for
both  handset  and  call  prices.  To  control  for  differences  in  them,  we  include  the
number of mobile phone operators and the Herfindahl index of mobile phone markets.
We also include a dummy if so-called prepaid cards are in use in country i in year t,
and similarly a dummy for the existence of a second generation digital mobile phone
network. The switch from first generation analog phones to second generation digital
phones constituted a discrete change in the quality of mobile telecommunications.
As telecommunications is a regulated industry, including only variables
controlling for differences in market structure and technology may not be enough. We
therefore include variables that have been used to explain the (government) decision
to adopt a first generation (analog) mobile phone network: the legal origin of the
country, and the political and civil rights. These may affect, through political
economy mechanisms, the regulatory regime of the industry, and thereby also
prices.14
A challenge in any diffusion study is to control for changes in the quality of
the good, and in the marginal cost of producing it. The second group of control
variables consists therefore of calendar year dummies. Assuming that the above
explained variables control adequately for differences in mobile phone call prices,
calendar year dummies should control for technical progress that takes place over
time.  They  also  capture  any  (unobservable)  trends  affecting  the  diffusion  of  mobile
14 Toivanen  (2004)  has  shown  that  these  variables  affect  the  introduction  of  (1st generation) mobile
phone systems.
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phones to the extent the trends are global. Furthermore, the inclusion of calendar year
dummies controls for any systematic variation in the year of introducing mobile
phones in a given country that may be driven by income inequality. In other words,
conditional on the calendar year dummies, it is as if the introduction of mobile phones
into our sample countries were random.
The third group of control variables consists of diffusion year dummies. There
are many reasons to include them. On the one hand, there may be post-launch learning
by  doing  that  will  affect  prices,  and  thereby  penetration  rates.  Furthermore,  if  the
diffusion is constrained by lack of information about the new good (the epidemic
model) or is an outcome of consumer herding or information cascades, the diffusion
year dummies capture the early stages of this common pattern. Finally, the diffusion
year dummies can control for any explanation (beyond the epidemic or cascade
models) that might give rise to the widely documented S-shaped diffusion path (see
e.g. Geroski 2000, who discusses such explanations in detail).
Our final group of control variables is related to our measures of income
inequality. As explained above, the income share of the highest earning decile is
measured a different number of times in different countries, and in different years.
Even after choosing to use only household level income measures that are denoted
‘high quality’ by WIDER, there still exist potential measurement problems. We
attempt to control for these by introducing a vector of year-of-measurement dummies
that take the value one in any year if the income variable used for that county-year
observation has been measured in year t.15 These year-of-measurement dummies
15 Take  Mauritius  as  an  example:  It  is  in  our  data  from  1989  onwards,  and  income  of  the  highest
earnind decile has been measured in 1988 and 1995. We therefore use the 1988 inequality measure for
all the observations from 1989 to 1994, and the 1995 measure from 1995 onwards. The 1988 year-of-
measurement dummy therefore takes the value one for each Mauritian observation from 1989 to 1994,
and the 1995 year-of-measurement dummy the value one for all Mauritian observations from 1995
onwards.
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capture for example measurement error that is due to (world-wide) changes in the
calculation of the income share of the highest earning decile. Our results are robust to
using an alternative control for the potential measurement errors in the income
inequality, as well as to not controlling for them at all.
B. Estimation results
We estimate the model using three different covariance matrices, and a non-
parametric estimator. The first estimates are OLS with a robust covariance matrix.
Second, we allow the error terms to be clustered at country level and third, estimate a
random effects model that allows for unobserved country-level heterogeneity that is
uncorrelated with our explanatory variables.16 Finally,  we  use  a  least  absolute
deviations (LAD) estimator.
Column 1 in Table 2 gives the OLS results. No group of control variables is
redundant, for the country/industry characteristics, the calendar year dummies, the
diffusion year dummies, and the year of measurement dummies are each jointly
highly significant as a group. Of the country characteristics, population, and the age
dependency ratio affect the penetration rate negatively. The negative population
coefficient simply implies that keeping the geographic size of the country, the urban-
rural mix of population etc. constant, an increase in population by 10% leads to a
circa 5% lower penetration rate of mobile phones. Thus, the number of mobile
phones is increasing in population, but there are “diseconomies of scale”. This would
seem  to  be  in  line  with  the  intentions  of  the  developers’  of  the  Scandinavian  NMT
system, for example. There, the initial purpose for investing in development of a
mobile  phone  system  was  to  provide  a  technology  to  extend  phone  services  to  the
large sparsely populated parts of the countries. Gdp per capita affects the penetration
16 We cannot estimate fixed effects panel data models as we have little if any within country variation
in the income inequality variable.
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rate positively as expected. Share of urban population also has a positive and
statistically significant effect. Looking at market structure and technology variables,
we  find  that  the  number  of  licenses  and  the  prepaid  and  digital  dummies  affect
diffusion positively and are statistically significant. The Herfindahl index obtains a
negative and statistically significant coefficient. Thus both market structure and
technology affect the penetration rate as expected. Of the political economy variables,
the dummy for socialist legal origin countries carries a significant negative
coefficient, that for French legal origin a positive one. Greater political and civil
rights lead to a higher penetration rate. All calendar year dummies but one obtain
statistically significant coefficients, as do all diffusion year dummies (at 9% level or
better). Five out of eleven year-of-measurement dummies carry coefficients that are
significant at 10% level or better. The most important coefficient, that of the (log) of
the income share of the highest earning decile, is positive (value 1.57) and significant
at better than 1% confidence level.
In column (2), we allow the error terms to be clustered within countries. While
the point estimates are identical, their statistical significance is weaker throughout.
The coefficient of the income share of the highest earning decile is significant at 7%
level.
In column (3) we present results from estimating the same specification with a
random effects panel data estimator. The significance levels of individual coefficients
improve in most cases compared to columns (1) and (2). Population and the age-
dependency ratio affect, for example, the penetration rate negatively, while the
proportion of urban population and gdp per capita affect it positively. The controls for
call prices work as in column (1). The better are the political and civil rights, the
higher is the penetration ratio. Countries of socialist origin have lower penetration
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rates. Again almost all of the calendar year and diffusion year dummies obtain
significant  coefficients,  but  only  few  of  the  year-of-measurement  dummies  do.  The
coefficient of the income share of the highest earning decile is now slightly lower than
in column (1) at 1.05, but is significant at 3% level.
In  column (4)  we  report  the  LAD estimates.  The  great  advantage  of  LAD is
that  it  is  robust  to  outliers.   The  results  are  generally  close  to  those  obtained  using
OLS, three main differences being 1) the larger, now marginally significant, negative
coefficient of the proportion of females, 2) the smaller in absolute value but still
negative coefficient of the Herfindahl index, and 3) the insignificance of the digital
technology dummy (though the point estimate is close to those in columns (1)-(3)).
The coefficient of the income share of the highest earning decile is now clearly larger
than with other estimators, at 2.59, and highly significant.
Our first robustness check is to exclude Spain which is a clear outlier in our
data both regarding some socio-economic variables, and in particular, the penetration
rate and the income share of the highest earning decile. Our results are considerably
strengthened when Spain is excluded. For example, the OLS coefficient of the income
share of the highest earning decile is 2.44 and significant at .001 level even when
standard errors are clustered at country level (compare to column (2)).
Second, we have checked (using both OLS and LAD) that the results are robust to
using linear instead of logarithmic versions of the continuous controls, and/or to using
the level of the income share of the highest earning decile instead of its log. We also
compared a linear specification against our log-log specification using a test proposed
by Davidson and McKinnon (1993, pp. 491-492). The p-value of the test where the
linear specification is the Null hypothesis against the alternative log-log specification
is .000.
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Third, our result is robust to leaving out the year-of-measurement dummies,
and to using as an alternative measurement control the difference between the
observation year and the year of measurement of the income variable. This alternative
allows us to control for linear changes in the income variable, and encompasses the
often used method of interpolating a value for those years in which no measurement
took place.
In summary, the data support a key prediction of our model: In the early stages of
the diffusion path, the higher is the income share of the highest earning individuals,
the higher is the penetration rate of the new good.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The large literature on technical change and income (wage) inequality has
demonstrated that technical change has been skill-biased in the 20th century. In other
words, technical change has favored those individuals in the labor market that are in
the upper tail of the skill (and wage) distribution, leading to increased wage
inequality.
Technical change does however not only affect productivity at work. The
other fruit of technical progress are new (and improved) consumption goods. We
modeled  technical  progress  as  an  enlargement  of  the  choice  set  of  consumers,  and
showed that a consumer adopts earlier, the higher is her income. Further, comparing
the adoption decision of a consumer under two different budget constraints we
showed that technical progress leads to a permanent increase in welfare inequality.
Thus, while making everybody better off in absolute terms, the introduction of new
goods also has a surprising side-effect. It may make the poor worse off relative to the
rich.
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Theory further suggests that there is a close relationship between income
inequality and the diffusion of new consumption goods. With homogenous tastes, the
income distribution and the price path of the new technology are the sole determinants
of technology diffusion. Theory predicts that the more unequal is the distribution of
income, the higher is the penetration rate of the new consumption good in the early
stages of the diffusion process. Using international data on mobile phones and the
income share of the highest earning decile we found support for this hypothesis.
Taken together, our theoretical and empirical results therefore suggest that because of
technical progress, the degree of welfare inequality is systematically underestimated
by the wage distribution.
The documented skill-biased nature of technical progress means that high-
skilled individuals’ incomes increase more than those of low-skilled individuals. Our
theoretical analysis shows that higher income individuals benefit more from technical
progress that is materialized through the introduction of new goods. Our empirical
analysis yields evidence supporting our theory, in particular its prediction that income
distribution is an important driver of the penetration rate of a new good. Piecing
together these effects – the skill-biased nature of technical progress, and the positive
relationship between income and benefits from the introduction of new goods through
technical progress – suggests that technological change disproportionately benefits
highly educated individuals.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean S.D.
Population 44 400 000 107 000 000
Surface area (sq. km) 516 585 662 685
Proportion of urban population
(%)
45.616 19.247
Gdp per capita (PPP $) 3785.05 2753.84
Main telephone lines (per 000) 78.150 97.408
Proportion of females (%) 50.361 1.204
Age dependency ratio 0.700 0.160
Political and civil rights 0.572 0.226
English legal origin 0.352 0.478
French legal origin 0.426 0.495
Socialist legal origin 0.221 0.415
Number of telecom operators 1.760 1.175
Herfindahl index 0.788 0.285
Prepaid 0.104 0.306
Digital 0.451 0.571
Income share of highest earning
decile (%)
31.448 6.270
Notes: 318 observations, 52 countries. Observations from 1981-1998.
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Table 2
Estimation Results
Variable OLS
(robust)
OLS
(clustered)
Random Effects LAD
Population -.513***
(.0.065)
-.513***
(.103)
-.470***
(.072)
-.522***
(.098)
Surface Area -.009
(.017)
-.009
(.011)
-.013
(.014)
-.011
(.021)
Urban .546**
(.244)
.546
(.357)
.781***
(.291)
.691**
(.304)
GDP per capita .595**
(.302)
.595
(.408)
.570**
(.255)
.322
(.360)
Main telephone
lines
-.026
(.137)
-.026
(.221)
-.122
(.145)
-.040
(.178)
Female
population
-5.549
(4.121)
-5.549
(6.958)
-1.280
(4.623)
-10.208*
(6.066)
Age dependency
ratio
-3.167***
(0.686)
-3.167***
(.892)
-3.028***
(.903)
-3.202***
(.942)
Political and
civil rights
-.403**
(.194)
-.403
(.349)
-.453**
(.189)
-.677**
(.279)
Socialist legal
origin
-.753***
(.300)
-.753*
(.452)
-.923***
(.327)
-.221
(.423)
French legal
origin
.425***
(.161)
.425
(.275)
.302
(.209)
.452*
(.256)
Number of telec.
operators
.328***
(.099)
.328***
(.117)
.295***
(.086)
.222*
(.130)
Prepaid .795***
(.239)
.795***
(.306)
.739***
(.216)
.606*
(.336)
Herfindahl -.106**
(.047)
-.106*
(.576)
-.781**
(.338)
-.0002**
(.0001)
Digital .528***
(.192)
.528*
(.270)
.540***
(.169)
.434
(.287)
Income share 1.571***
(.534)
1.571*
(.846)
1.054**
(.477)
2.595***
(.657)
Calendar year
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Diffusion year
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Measurement
year dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs. 318 318 318 318
R2 0.870 0.870 0.913 0.677
T1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
T2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
T3 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
T4 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
? - - 0.209 -
Notes: All continuous explanatory variables are in logs, and ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10%
levels. In columns (1) and (2), the reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. In column (2), they are
clustered within countries.  R2 for the lad estimator is the pseudo-R2.
T1 = joint significance of year-of-measurement dummies (p-value).
T2 = joint significance of diffusion year dummies (p-value).
T3 = joint significance of calendar year dummies (p-value).
?? = variance share of the random effect.
Figure 1
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APPENDIX I
In this Appendix we derive bounds for the degree of substitution between the outside good and the new
good that still yield (a) proposition 1 and (b) proposition 2.
Bound for Proposition 1: It is easy to show that the nominator in equation (3) is positive as
long as *( ,0) ( ( ),0)yx xy x xU U U w U w p T= > - - , where
*T  denotes the optimal adoption time.
If x and y are complements, the inequality holds trivially, because the right hand side is negative due to
concavity of U. If the goods are substitutes, the right hand side provides us with a bound that ensures
that proposition 1 holds. The more concave U, the stronger substitutes y and x can be without
compromising our proposition 1.
Bound for Proposition 2: Consider first *2( , )t TÎ ¥ , i.e., the period during which a
consumer has adopted the new good irrespective of whether her income is high ( 1w ) or low ( 2w ). We
need to establish the conditions under which
(A.1) 1 2 1 2( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ,0) ( ,0)U w p t y U w p t y U w U w- - - ³ -
holds even if 0¹xyU . To do this, rewrite (A.1) as
(A.2)
1 2( ) ( )
0 0
( , ) (0, ) ( , ) (0, )
w p t w p t
x xU y d U y U y d U yt t t t
- -é ù é ù
+ - +ê ú ê ú
ê ú ê úë û ë û
ò ò
1 2
0 0
( ,0) (0,0) ( ,0) (0,0)
w w
x xU d U U d Ut t t t
é ù é ù
³ + - +ê ú ê ú
ê ú ê úë û ë û
ò ò
Rearranging (A.2) yields
(A.3) òò ³
-
-
1
2
1
2
)0,(),(
)(
)(
w
w
x
tpw
tpw
x dUdyU tttt .
The right hand side of (A.3) can be decomposed to obtain
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Moving the first term from the right hand side to the left we obtain
(A.5) ( )
1 1 2
2 1 2
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ( ,0) ( ,0) ( ,0)
w p t w w
x x x x
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The integrand on the left hand side of (A.5) is the definition of substitutability/complementarity when
consumption of one good is continuous and that of the other discrete, measured over the relevant
income range. The right hand side is always negative due to concavity of U.
The left hand side of (A.5) is positive for complements and therefore the inequality always holds
for complements. That fact, together with the first part of proposition 2 which showed that
consumption inequality increases when * *1 2[ , )t T TÎ irrespective of the degree of complementarity,
establishes our claim that with complements, proposition 2 always holds.
For substitutes, the left hand side is negative, and the right hand side (the value of which is
independent of the new good) gives an upper bound for the degree of substitutability. This upper bound
is, however, too strict, as it ignores the increased welfare inequality that obtains over * *1 2[ , )t T TÎ .
Taking that effect into account and recalling the definition of xyU yields, after discounting the
differences in flow utilities to t = 0, the following inequality:
(A.6) ( )
*
1 2
* * *
22 2 1
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( )
w p t T
rt rt rt
xy
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-¥ ¥
- - -
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where
1 2
1 2( ) ( )
( ,0) ( ,0)
w w
x x
w p t w p t
A U d U dt t t t
- -
º -ò ò and
( )1 2( ( ), ) ( ( ),0)B U w p t y U w p tº - - - .
The first term on the right hand side of (A.6) is simply the discounted value of the right hand side of
(A.5). The second term on the right hand side of (A.6) measures the discounted consumption inequality
that prevails for * *1 2[ , )t T TÎ . It is positive by the first part of proposition 2, and as it is multiplied by -
1, the whole right hand side is negative. The right hand side of (A.6) is thus larger in absolute value
than the right hand side of (A.5), providing us with the bound we looked for. We have therefore shown
that unless xyU  is “very” negative, inequality (A.6) holds strictly. This, in turn, implies that
proposition 2 holds when the outside good and the new good are substitutes.
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APPENDIX II
In this Appendix we derive bounds for the degree to which the new good can be used for production,
using two different ways of modeling the production aspect of the new good. We use a simple
extension of our base model, where the adoption of the good leads both to the same amount of utility
from consumption of the new good as in the base model, but in addition it also increases the income of
the consumer because the new good increases the productivity of the consumer.  We define the degree
to which the new good is a production asset first by ?,  which we define as the amount by which the
flow income of the consumer is increased by adoption. Thus the maximization problem of the
consumer now takes the following form:
(B.1) òò
¥
-- -D++=
T
rt
T
rt
T dteytpwUdtewUYXV )),(()0,(),(max
0
.
The first order condition is changed accordingly, as is the equation for the effect of an increase in flow
income on the optimal adoption time, which now is given by:
(B.2)
)*),((
)0,()*),((*
yTpwUp
wUyTpwU
dw
dT
xt
xx
-D+
--D+
= .
The denominator’s sign is unchanged, but the following is a sufficient condition for the sign of the
numerator to remain unchanged:
(B.3) e+D=¥® )(lim tpt , 0>e .
The economic content of (B.3) is that the increase in flow income has to be less than the purchase price
of the new good.
An alternative formulation would be to model the increase in the flow income as proportional
to existing flow income, i.e., as ?w. This formulation would lead the following sufficient condition
(B.4) e+D=¥® w
tp
t
)(lim , 0>e , w" .
The  interpretation  of  (B.4)  is  that  the  per  cent  increase  in  the  flow income has  to  be  less  than  is  the
income share of the purchase price of the new good.
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APPENDIX III
In this Appendix we present the countries in the data set, with information on when mobile phones
were introduced in each country, the penetration rate of mobile phones in 1998, and the income share
of the highest earning decile. The year of introduction gives also the number of observations, as our
observation period ends in 1998 for all countries. The income share that is reported is the latest
observation for each country, i.e., the value which is used for 1998 in the regressions.
Table A.1
Countries in the data set
Country First year in data Penetration rate of mobile phones in
1998, %
Income share of highest
earning decile in 1998, %
Algeria 1990 0.06 26.8
Bangladesh 1992 0.06 28.6
Belarus 1994 0.12 33.3
Bulgaria 1993 1.59 24.6
Burkina Faso 1996 0.03 39.5
Burundi 1995 0.01 26.6
Cambodia 1992 0.52 33.8
Central African Republic 1996 0.03 47.7
Côte d'Ivoire 1996 0.63 28.8
Croatia 1991 4.73 23.1
Ecuador 1992 2.05 33.8
Egypt 1996 0.32 25
Gambia 1995 0.40 37.6
Ghana 1992 0.22 26.1
Guinea Republic 1996 0.25 32
Guyana 1992 0.19 32
India 1995 0.11 33.5
Indonesia 1987 0.52 28.3
Jamaica 1991 3.01 28.9
Jordan 1995 1.53 29.8
Kazakhstan 1994 0.14 26.3
Kenya 1992 0.03 34.9
Laos 1993 0.13 26.4
Latvia 1992 6.87 26.1
Lithuania 1992 6.33 25.6
Madagascar 1996 0.09 36.7
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Table A.1, continued
Countries in the data set
Country First year in data Penetration rate of mobile phones in
1998, %
Income share of highest
earning decile in 1998, %
Mali 1997 0.04 40.4
Mauritius 1989 5.31 29.9
Mexico 1989 3.49 39.2
Mongolia 1996 0.15 24.5
Morocco 1988 0.44 30.5
Niger 1997 0.01 29.3
Nigeria 1992 0.02 40.8
Pakistan 1990 0.20 35.7
Papua New Guinea 1995 0.11 40.5
Peru 1990 3.08 34.3
Philippines 1990 2.01 36.6
Poland 1992 5.28 26.5
Senegal 1995 0.24 33.5
South Africa 1986 6.17 45.9
Spain 1982 17.91 19.0
Sri Lanka 1989 0.82 28.0
Tanzania 1994 0.12 30.1
Thailand 1986 3.41 32.4
Tunisia 1985 0.43 30.7
Turkey 1986 5.56 32.3
Turkmenistan 1995 0.07 31.5
Uganda 1995 0.17 31.2
Vietnam 1992 0.22 29.9
Zambia 1996 0.09 39.2
Zimbabwe 1996 0.49 46.9
